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Abstract
This essay assesses the central arguments of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century. We
note Piketty’s limited engagement with and active distancing from the writings of Marx. Piketty’s
location within the disciplinary boundaries of academic economics seems to have profoundly
shaped his surprisingly apolitical analysis. Engagement with the political dimensions of capital is
further constrained to increase the book’s influence upon policy. We analyze important limitations
to Piketty’s work that result from these disciplinary constraints. Important politically implicated
concepts, problems, and approaches that relate to Piketty’s substantial empirical work are: labor
process studies, research on speculative capitalism, and literature highlighting institutional and
political determinants among varieties of capitalism.
Keywords
capitalism, class, critical theory, inequality, Marxism, patrimony, political economy

Introduction
It has been two decades since a social scientific work on inequality last attracted the level of media
attention received by Thomas Piketty’s New York Times best-selling Capital in the Twenty-First
Century. In 1994, Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray published their controversial The Bell
Curve, a book that quickly sold 400,000 copies amid media coverage, policy discussion, and widespread engagement (and criticism) by academics. Popular attention to The Bell Curve faded quickly
while academic discussion peaked soon after. We suspect that Piketty’s bubble of notoriety is fated
Corresponding author:
Daniel Krier, Iowa State University, 4 East Hall, Ames, IA 50011, USA.
Email: segelkrier@gmail.com

350

Critical Sociology 41(2)

to be similarly short-lived, despite occasional displays of academic and journalistic interest (including
being named the Financial Times’ Business Book of the Year in November 2014). These two
books, while profoundly different in tone, approach, methodological sophistication, and scholarly
heft, seem committed to a similar goal: to make themselves available as resources to policymakers
while appearing always to stand upon an academic-disciplinary pedestal that raises them above the
hurly-burly of politics. Much of the publication success of both works in the American media market
surely derives from this ostensibly apolitical stance.
Despite this affinity with one of the more notorious publications of the 1990s, the attention and
praise received by Capital in the Twenty-First Century has been well deserved. The book builds
on the work of dozens of sophisticated economists, and contains a wealth of empirical time-series
data on comparative income distribution. This makes it an impressive resource for future scholarship
and analysis. Nonetheless, the book remains impaired by its excessively narrow disciplinary
focus within contemporary academic economics. Piketty’s work clearly strains to avoid any whiff
of the political. It shies from an engagement with Marx and Marxist interpretive traditions that
have long sought a differentiated analysis of the mechanisms and dynamics of capital. It therefore
fails to connect with important current strands of critical theory. In this review we hope to point
to potential moments of such connection.
Piketty appears – doubtless for good reason within academic economics – to be so committed
to first-order empiricism that his book seems uninterested in, even dismissive of, interpretive
conclusions. This is understandable across the European and American spheres, where central
banks, technocratic policy institutions, think tanks, and academic work hew compulsively to a
rhetoric of apolitical economic science. Unfortunately, Capital in the Twenty-First Century thus
becomes at once too much and too little: it sets up expectations in left-progressive readers familiar
with Marx that it might in fact contribute directly to critical theory by putting its data at the service
of a causal-functional analysis of capital. Unfortunately it does not, for it does not interrogate capital
per se. Rather, the book is a description of the historical relations between national income and the
return on capital. It therefore provides less a causal explanation of the return on capital than it does
an accounting of the income that accretes to the owners of capital. This distracts from the complex,
layered, and dynamic nature of capital by flattening it into income, and income into wealth. Thus
for all its strengths, Piketty’s work constrains critical approaches to political economy, and serves
further to evacuate the political from the sphere of the economic. Critical theorists have much work
to do to turn Piketty’s near-compulsive empiricism into work that can go beyond the narrow disciplinary confines of academic economics and reveal and develop understanding of the political core
of all economic policy.

Piketty’s ‘Laws’
Reading Piketty’s Capital carefully requires commitment. The work is a substantial, well-argued
depiction of systemic wealth and income inequality in modern capitalism. Though the book
is voluminous, at its heart is a large series of straightforward line graphs depicting long-term
patterns within an impressive array of data: centuries-long time series of national income and
wealth statistics across several continents. The simplicity of the graphs is in keeping with the
spare, even austere, mathematically reduced theses that are presented as laws of capitalism. In a
world awash in complex, contingent and relativistic theories, Piketty’s rather old-fashioned
claim to the discovery of unvarying laws is unusual. It further helps to account for the public
fascination with the book, especially among those who – despite Piketty’s own studiously
apolitical stance – represent left-progressive policy positions.
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What are the ‘fundamental laws of capitalism’ that Piketty claims to have discovered? Expressed
in properly scientific Greek letters, the formula of the first such law is α = τ x β: the share of
national wealth that accrues to capital (α) is equal to the rate of return on capital (τ) times the ratio of
capital to income (β). This law is a ‘pure accounting identity … tautological …’, but Piketty argues
that it is important since it places the ‘three most important concepts for analyzing the capitalist
system’ in relation to each other (Piketty, 2014: 52). The second law is expressed β = s / g: the ratio
of capital to income of a country (β) is equal to the savings rate (s) divided by the economic growth
rate (g) (Piketty, 2014: 166). Though not expressed as a fundamental law (which serves to distance
him from Marx), the formula from the book that expresses Piketty’s central argument about
inequality in capitalism most directly is r > g: the rate of return on capital (r) is greater than the
economic growth rate (g). In short, capital accumulates. Piketty distills long-range figures for
‘the inequality r > g’ (of 4–5% return on capital and about 1% long-term growth) but the variation in time and place is considerable, so that r > g ‘should be analyzed as a historical reality
dependent on a variety of mechanisms and not as an absolute logical necessity’ (Piketty, 2014:
361). Though mathematically expressed, Piketty avoids complex statistical analysis but rather
pictorially represents variations among income, wealth, growth, and rates of return in a variety
of places and times. There is nothing complex about the math: Piketty’s conclusions result from
inferences, not inferential statistics.
To us, the great strength of the book is Piketty’s rigorous aggregation of national statistics from
very diverse sources that make possible such powerful, large-scale time-series. This was an
immense undertaking, and Piketty and his collaborators deserve the accolades they have received
for making this laboriously constructed data set available on his website (http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/
en/capital21c2). Such strenuous aggregation of data into such straightforward representations
schemas without shilly-shallying is unusual in the contemporary academy. Indeed, it is reminiscent
of the 19th and early 20th century economic scholarship that Piketty frequently cites and openly
admires, such as Willford King’s The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States (1915).
At the same time, however, Piketty scrupulously avoids interpretive claims that might pigeonhole him as ‘left’ or ‘radical’ – or even as ‘French’. His work has impressive scale, but its scope
is narrow, even pinched, such that no accusation that his academic work might be tainted with
political motivation be allowed to stick. Even where Piketty admits that political factors play a
major role in the historical processes he elucidates, he buries his claims deep in the text and shies
away from interpretive conclusions. For example, he states flatly that ‘the price of capital is …
always in part a social and political construct’. This significant admission is, however, hedged
rhetorically between two phrases that give it a throwaway character: ‘Last but not least’ and ‘This
is obvious’ (Piketty, 2014: 188). It thus remains for other scholars to use Piketty’s material to
found critical interpretive arguments that do not accede to an evacuation of the political.
Piketty is thoughtful, careful and transparent about the sources of this data, and is cautious to
specify what he feels are appropriate interpretive limitations. Standing back from the book, its
most impressive accomplishment is the revelation of the magnitude and near universality of
income and wealth inequality. Reviewing the graphs, clear law-like structural relationships
between Piketty’s concepts come into view: despite massive historical and political changes, the
ratio of capital to income varies within a surprisingly narrow range across nations and centuries.
In Piketty’s graphs, patterns of wealth and income inequality appear surprisingly similar across
national borders that demarcate distinctive political economies. Yet, American critical theorists
and left-progressives will find it affirming to see that our time (post-1970s) and our place (AngloAmerican liberal market economies) are indeed especially unequal relative to the recent past and
to other nations.
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In an interesting and revealing move, in the service of his arguments about patrimonial capitalism
in the 19th century and earlier, Piketty even seems to privilege the literary above the politicaleconomic as an interpretive scheme. The income and wealth dynamics distilled into formulas and
graphically depicted by Piketty are frequently illustrated with literature, particularly Honoré de
Balzac and Jane Austen. The most compelling of these illustrations is drawn from Balzac’s Père
Goriot and turns upon a young man’s calculations as he ponders the relative returns to the pursuit
of a professional career versus marriage to a wealthy woman (see especially Piketty, 2014: 238–40).
Austen’s characters engage in the same ethical calculus, though in a different context and with
different results. The dilemmas faced by impecunious, literary dowry-hunters who acquire patrimony
through matrimony capture Piketty’s own moral stance toward inherited wealth in capital: given
the long-run tendency for r > g, returns to wealth frequently exceed returns to work. This turns out
to be one of Piketty’s most vigorously emphasized themes: as economic growth slows, capitalism
reinforces inherited wealth while reducing rewards for work.

Piketty’s Capital and Marx’s Capital
Clearly, Piketty’s failure to engage Marx impairs Capital’s utility for critical theorists. Piketty
does make reference to Marx at several points in his work, which contains within its rhetorical
framing – though obliquely – a response to and criticism of Marx’s analysis of capital.
Unfortunately, it also seems that Piketty’s commitment to the maintenance of his credibility
within transatlantic academic economics leads him to be unduly dismissive of Marx, and to appear
unwilling to raise serious Marxist questions about the nature and functioning of capital. Throughout
the book we see a range of rhetorical moves that serve to mask the political moments always
present within economic activity.
Piketty has even represented himself as unfamiliar with, if not uninterested in, the basic arguments of Marx’s Capital. In an interview with Isaac Chotiner published in The New Republic in
May 2014, Piketty was asked to ‘talk a little bit about the effect of Marx on your thinking and how
you came to start reading him’. Piketty responded: ‘Marx? … I never managed really to read it. I
mean I don’t know if you’ve tried to read it. Have you tried? … The Communist Manifesto of
1848 is a short and strong piece. Das Kapital, I think, is very difficult to read and for me it was
not very influential.’ Chotiner prompted Piketty by noting that ‘…your book, obviously with the
title, it seemed like you were tipping your hat to him [Marx] in some ways’. To which Piketty
responded: ‘No not at all, not at all! The big difference is that my book is a book about the history
of capital. In the books of Marx there’s no data’ (Chotiner, 2014).
Chotiner’s questioning of Piketty about his engagement with Marx is reasonable given that the
first reference to Karl Marx occurs in the third sentence of the first page of Piketty’s Capital: ‘Do
the dynamics of private capital accumulation inevitably lead to the concentration of wealth in ever
fewer hands, as Karl Marx believed in the nineteenth century?’ (Piketty, 2014: 1). On pages seven
through 11, Piketty criticizes Marx’s Capital, boiling it down to several theses that he perceives
as flawed, including the principles of ‘infinite accumulation’ and ‘perpetual divergence’. Piketty reads
Marx’s analysis as symptomatic of economists’ ‘no doubt overly developed taste for apocalyptic
predictions’ (Piketty, 2014: 11). Piketty often pairs Marx’s name with the idea of apocalypse: ‘My
conclusions are less apocalyptic than those implied by Marx’s principle of infinite accumulation
and perpetual divergence’ (Piketty, 2014: 27).
Piketty reads Marx as wrongly theorizing an ‘inexorable tendency for capital to accumulate and
become concentrated in ever fewer hands, with no natural limit’, signaling an ‘apocalyptic end to
capitalism’ (Piketty, 2014: 9). Marx’s ‘dark prophecy’ was in error because of Marx’s ignorance of
productivity improvements, because he ‘totally neglected the possibility of durable technological

Krier and Amidon

353

progress and steadily increasing productivity’, which Piketty views as ‘a counterweight to the
process of accumulation and concentration of private capital’ (Piketty, 2014: 10). This is perhaps
the most glaring misunderstanding of Marx in the book: Piketty’s repeated claim that Marx ‘implicitly
relies on a strict assumption of zero productivity growth over the long run’ (Piketty, 2014: 27).
Marx is further criticized for methodological errors, because he ‘no doubt lacked the statistical
data needed to refine his predictions’ and intellectual dishonesty because he ‘decided on his conclusions in 1848, before embarking on the research needed to justify them’ (Piketty, 2014: 10). In
a footnote to the text, Piketty adds that Marx ‘occasionally sought to make use of the best available
statistics of the day but … in a rather impressionistic way and without always establishing a clear
connection to his theoretical argument’ (Piketty, 2014: 580). Piketty diminishes Marx as one of a
number of proto-economists who ‘had been talking about inequalities for decades without citing
any sources whatsoever or any methods for comparing one era with another or deciding between
competing hypotheses’ (Piketty, 2014: 13). Even when Marx did use statistics, he ‘usually adopted
a fairly anecdotal and unsystematic approach to the available statistics’ (Piketty, 2014: 229). At
moments, Piketty views Marx as a vigorous stylist who ‘evidently wrote in great political fervor’,
making ‘hasty pronouncements from which it was difficult to escape’ (Piketty, 2014: 10), and adds
that ‘Marx’s literary talent partially accounts for his immense influence’ (Piketty, 2014: 580). At
other moments, Piketty criticizes Marx at once for lack of rigor and for unclear writing style: ‘Marx
did not use mathematical models, and his prose was not always limpid, so it is difficult to be sure
what he had in mind’ (Piketty, 2014: 228).
We will not narrate full correctives to Piketty’s statements regarding Marx. Even a cursory reading
of Marx’s Capital, the Grundrisse, or the essay, ‘Value, Price, Profit’ will demonstrate Marx’s
emphasis upon productivity growth as a consequence of the pursuit of relative surplus value. Marx
strove to address the statistical evidence that was reliably available in his time, and dialectically
reconsidered his positions throughout his life. The degree to which Piketty is unschooled in Marx
is not a significant issue for us. Rather, the disciplinary boundaries of the economics necessarily
privileged by Piketty foreclose Marx and Marxian analytics.
The most important consequence of Piketty’s foreclosure of Marx is that capital remains
fundamentally fetishized as an undifferentiated object that radiates power. Marx’s value theory
defetishizes commodities, money, and capital, revealing value as generalized labor embedded
during the labor process and socially validated in exchange. Piketty does not analyze value,
leading him to conflate capital with wealth, using these terms ‘interchangeably, as if they were
perfectly synonymous’ (Piketty, 2014: 47). To Piketty, capital is ‘the sum total of nonhuman
assets that can be owned and exchanged’, a long list that includes real estate (even private
homes) and ‘financial and professional capital (plants, infrastructure, machinery, patents, and
so on) used by firms and government agencies’ (Piketty, 2014: 46). To Marx, capital as such
refers to wealth invested in the process of commodity production where it mixes with living
labor to produce an excess known as profit. Even King (1915) distinguished between active
wealth (invested and circulating) and inert or passive wealth. Piketty makes no such distinction,
and thus ventures no analysis of the constitutive nature of capital (value, the labor process, the
working day, the extraction of surplus). For him, such work ventures beyond the legitimate
discursive boundaries of the discipline of economics.
Marx’s Capital, Volume 1, focuses upon the analysis of production: by defetishizing the capital
process (seeing commodities as value, as crystalized labor power, by analyzing the working day),
Marx kept in view the social relationships and political systems that constitute an economy.
Remaining within the confines of economic disciplinarity, Piketty is unable to defetishize capital
and to analyze it in terms of the labor process. Inequality is therefore reduced to a problem of
consumption and distribution, of unequal incomes and possessions. Whereas Marx delved deep
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into work, production, and the labor process to reveal the nature of capital, Piketty’s analysis of
inequality avoids the workplace altogether.

Convergence and Divergence, Commons and Enclosures
To Piketty, national inequalities of income and wealth are shaped by contradictory forces pushing
toward ‘convergence’ (reduced inequality) and ‘divergence’ (increased inequality). The failure to
defetishize capital by analyzing the labor process is especially limiting when Piketty explains the
two forces of ‘convergence’, both emanating out of colleges and universities: diffusion of knowledge
and acquisition of skills and training. Piketty views increased acquisition of skills and knowledge
as the foundation of a ‘patrimonial middle class’ that reduces inequality within nations. The same
forces – increased education and acquisition of know-how – also lead to reduction of inequality
between nations. Poor countries of the world take note: ‘by adopting the modes of production of
the rich countries and acquiring skills comparable to those found elsewhere, the less developed
countries have leapt forward in productivity and increased their national incomes’. The mechanism
is ‘fundamentally a process of the diffusion and sharing of knowledge – the public good par excellence
– rather than a market mechanism’ (Piketty, 2014: 21).
Here Piketty gestures toward but fails to articulate with the political-economic arguments of the
‘alter-modernity’ theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2011), who see the ‘commons’ or
‘commonwealth’ as byproducts created and enriched through capitalism. Forms of association,
know-how, information, and knowledge generated within capitalism flow into the ‘cultural commons’. Political struggles in our time are less focused upon labor and working-class activism than
struggles against appropriation, privatization, and enclosure of the commons in order to foster a
de-commodification of social life. Piketty’s uncomplicated assurance that knowledge-diffusion
and skill-acquisition spread readily to the lower orders underestimates capitalist power to enclose.
Hardt and Negri (2011) see political struggle as necessary to overcome capital’s surveillance and
control systems, including the army of property lawyers that enforces the trademark, copyright and
patent machinery securing intellectual property.
While Piketty incorporates ‘immaterial capital’ (patents, intellectual property, brands, goodwill, trademarks) into his definition of capital, he provides no separate analysis of them. Similarly,
his disciplinary constraints do not allow him to recognize the ‘fictitious’ nature of immaterial
capital (as understood by theorists including Marx, Rudolf Hilferding, and David Harvey). Piketty
therefore cannot follow Hardt and Negri into a political analysis of the growing importance of
immaterial production (Hardt and Negri, 2011: 132–7), and the important role intellectual property
law plays in the privatization of culture (Boyle, 2003). Analysts who study the unpaid labor of
consumers point to a condition of double-exploitation that consumers rarely understand with
clarity and that lies beyond Piketty’s disciplinary horizon (Cova and Dalli, 2009: 29).
Disciplinary conventions further seem to limit Piketty’s understanding of the primary force
behind divergence to the outsized earnings of ‘super-managers’: ‘this spectacular increase in
inequality largely reflects an unprecedented explosion of very elevated incomes from labor, a
veritable separation of the top managers of large firms from the rest of the population’ (Piketty,
2014: 24). Piketty attributes this rise to the selfish interests and exceptional bargaining power of
top managers in corporations, who ‘have the power to set their own remuneration, in some cases
without limit and in many cases without any clear relation to their individual productivity’
(Piketty, 2014: 24).
Such framing of excessive executive compensation as a classic principal/agent hazard, though
consistent with academic economic discourse, discounts the politicized financial deregulation of
recent decades and how it dramatically increased the power of large, speculative stockholders to
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control corporate affairs. Beginning in the 1980s, stockholders of US corporations grew more
organized and active, electing boards of directors who awarded immense stock options to the
executives they appointed. Stock options (and bonuses tied to stock price) ensured that US executives were focused ‘liked a laser’ upon increasing the short-term value of corporate stock by giving
them a ‘piece of the action’ (Krier, 2005). Contrary to Piketty’s narrow interpretation, executive
stock options were not ‘incomes from labor’ that were economically justified by ‘clear relation to
their individual productivity’ but rather payments akin to bribes (Piketty, 2014: 24). Piketty makes
a category mistake when he views executive compensation and stock options as labor income: they
are, in fact, a redistribution of the return to capital meant to incentivize management to increase
returns. The large growth in income inequality that Piketty graphs was not due to pay for efficient
work, but was a means to forge an unusually powerful corporate control structure.

The Varieties of Capital and the Social State
Writing within the disciplinary conventions of economics, Piketty documents the significant divergences in national patterns of inequality revealed in his graphs, but shies away from causal analysis.
Often, his discussion minimizes national variations while drawing attention to overarching
similarities, making it appear that he is in pursuit of a unitary theory of wealth and income inequality.
Fundamental differences between national capitalist systems have given rise to the extensive
‘varieties of capitalism’ literature that has developed in the borderlands between academic
economics, sociology, and business studies (see especially Weber, 1946; Hall and Soskice, 2001;
Esping-Anderson, 1990; Scruggs and Allan, 2008; Krier, 2008). Though a variety of ideal-type
rubrics are deployed in this literature, each finds important differences between ‘liberal market
economies’ (primarily Anglo-American) and ‘coordinated market economies’ (northern European
social democracies). Some approaches (Esping-Anderson, 1990; see also Weber, 1930, 1946) identify
additional varieties of capitalism clustered in the Catholic countries of southern Europe. We have
recoded the data files that Piketty has provided to scholars on his website by grouping the nations
in his database into three ‘varieties of capitalism’: northern European social democracies (whose
economic ethics align closely with Weber’s Pietists), Anglo-American liberal market economies
(whose economic ethics align closely with Weber’s Calvinists) and Catholic economies (whose
economic ethics align closely with Weber’s traditionalism). The political dimension is particularly
important in accounting for differences between these varieties of capitalism in the provision of
social insurance and public assistance. The intersection of risk-pooled social insurance with political
subjectivity (Amidon and Sanderson, 2012) varies widely across these political economic regimes
(see Appendix).
Piketty’s disciplinarity also seems to limit his interest in regional and sectional patterns of inequality within a given nation-state. Indeed, Capital’s dataset does not parse US statistics into counties,
states or regions, but remains aggregated at the national level. While Piketty notes in passing that
US northern states, during the 19th century at least, had extraordinarily low levels of inequality
while the southern states had very high levels of inequality that rivaled or exceeded aristocratic
Europe, and he notes the significance of slaveholding in this dynamic especially in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries, he ventures no deeper reflection upon how these historical politics of
expropriation might continue to affect capital formation (Piketty, 2014: 158–63). This is unfortunate,
because county-level US census data on income inequality reveal enormous differences among US
regions (US Census Bureau, 2012): northern tier states and the Midwest exhibit low levels of
inequality (on par with contemporary European social democracies), while the southern states
exhibit exceptionally high levels of inequality (on par with aristocratic Europe at its most unequal
peak). Such patterns of regional distinctiveness are consistent with Fischer’s (1989) Albion’s Seed
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and with other social histories mapping distinctive subcultures laid down by British and European
laws and customs. While these European folkways were modified in the American setting, the
translation of old world cultures to the colonies often resulted in concentration and clarification:
the New World setting enabled certain contradictions and tonal disharmonies to be worked out,
creating cultures with great logical self-consistency, durability and self-clarity.

The Evacuation of the Political and its Retrieval
For the critical theorist who is interested in the possibilities of politics, what can be learned from
Piketty’s constrained disciplinarity? In his writing and in interviews, Piketty does not simply set
himself apart from politically engaged scholarship, but projects the entire category of the political
into the utopian and its dialectically opposed double, apocalyptic prophecy (Piketty 2014: 6–12).
Such distancing is necessary for Piketty to maintain credibility within the branches of disciplinary
economics committed to positivist, non-Marxist positions. Critical theorists can only find it
perverse, however, that Piketty, in the name of retaining disciplinary credibility and legitimacy
within technocratic, bureaucratic policymaking, eliminates practical political engagement. In order
to preserve the possibility of policy impact, Piketty blunts his book’s potential for politics. Piketty
not only distances himself from Marx, but discounts his own proposal for a global tax on wealth as
‘utopian’ (Piketty, 2014: 471, 515–34). The most dispiriting aspect of Piketty’s Capital then is not
the dark projections of future inequality, but the work’s almost total resignation to disciplinary
conformity, such that the scholarly precondition for serious consideration by those who determine
policy is an abandonment of politics as purely utopian. What is even more disheartening is the
remarkable modesty, even banality, of Piketty’s ‘utopian’ dreams: he calls for a mere 5 percent tax
upon wealth.
Piketty’s Capital is the product of disciplinary conventions that define anything other than
descriptive empiricism as utopian. Within the boundaries of economics, Piketty’s single-minded
focus upon national income statistics need not be disturbed by any serious challenge to the
nation-state as a meaningful economic unit with globalization processes, nor by any Foucauldian
interrogation of the motives underlying the state surveillance and control that make possible the
collection of the data he analyzes, While Piketty’s book may punch his admission ticket into the
corridors of policy, the messier realities of politics remain for critical theorists to analyze.
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